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ENFORCED SELF-REGULATION: A NEW
STRATEGY FOR CORPORATE CRIME
CONTROL
John .Braithwaite*

The criminal justice system's failure to control corporations 1 has
been well documented. 2 Piecemeal reforms or modest increases in
enforcement budgets are unlikely to remedy this failure; indeed, ·
under the easygoing regulatory approach of the Reagan Administration, 3 it could become worse. Consequently, scholars studying corporate crime should adopt the long view. Radical approaches are
needed in the hope that some of them might blossom into control
strategies more potent than our forlorn existing armory of weapons
against corporate crime. Outstanding recent examples of such innovation have been Coffee's proposal for the equity :fine4 and Fisse's
suggestion that community service orders could be used as a sanction
against corporations.5 It is unimportant that these proposals lack
• Research Criminologist, Australian Institute of Criminology. B.A. 1972, University of
Queensland; Ph.D. 1977, University of Queensland. - Ed. I wish to thank Brent Fisse, Donna
Randall, Ross Cranston, Gil Geis, and the Socio-Legal Group at Northwestern University for
helpful co=ents.
I. Corporate crime is defined here as conduct of a corporation, or of individuals acting on
behalf of a corporation, that is proscribed and punishable by law. Following Sutherland, see
E. SUTHERLAND, WHITE-COLLAR CRIME (1949), I take the view that to exclude civil violations
from a consideration of corporate crime is an arbitrary obfuscation because of the frequent
provision in law for both civil and criminal prosecution of the same corporate conduct. In
considerable measure, the power of corporations is manifested in the fact that their wrongs are
so frequently punished only civilly. However, conduct subject only to damage awards without
any additional punishment (e.g., fines or punitive damages) is not within the definition of
corporate crime adopted here.
2. See, e.g., M. CLINARD & P. YEAGER, CORPORATE CRIME (1980); R. NADER, M. GREEN
& J. SELIGMAN, TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION (1976); J. REIMAN, THE RICH GET
RICHER AND THE POOR GET PRISON (1979); Geis, Upperworld Crime, in CURRENT PERSPECTIVES ON CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR (A. Blumberg ed. 1974).
3. See, e.g., Hudson, SEC May Be Losing Its Former Toughness, Some Observers Think,
Wall St. J., Mar. 22, 1982, at l, col. 6; Taylor, Antitrust Eeforcement Will Be More Selective,
Two Big Cases Indicate, Wall St. J., Jan. 11, 1982, at l, col. I.
4.· Coffee, "No Soul To J)amn: No Body To Kick'!· An Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REv. 386, 413-24 (1981) (hereinafter cited as Coffee,
Corporate Punishment); Coffee, Making the Punishment Fit the Corporation: The Problems of
Finding an' Optimal Corporation Criminal Sanction, l N. ILL. U. L. REV. 3, 14-21 (1980),
Under an "equity fine" approach the corporation would be forced to issue new equity securities to the value of the fine. For example, if a corporation had five million shares outstanding,
a 10% equity fine would see 500,000 shares handed over to the state's crime victim compensation fund.
5. Fisse, Community Service as a Sanction Against Corporations, 1981 Wis. L. REv. 970,

1466

E'!forced Se!f-Regulation

June 1982)

1467

fine tuning, or that their authors have not suggested a politically realistic strategy for their legislative adoption, for they have enlivened
the intellectual landscape. Such ideas should not be prematurely
discarded because of their deficiencies or impracticalities. The study
of corporate crime needs a period when a thousand flowers are allowed to bloom if it is tQ break out of the straight-jacket of the failed
strategies of the past. This Article advocates another "impractical"
idea for corporate crime control- government enforced self-regulation of illegal corporate conduct.
Part I outlines the concept of enforced self-regulation, sketches
its theoretical underpinnings, and illustrates its application in the
context of corporate accounting standards. Part II argues the merits
of enforced self-regulation. Part III dispels notions that the proposal
is a radical departure from existing regulatory practice and points to
areas in which necessary empirical research could be conducted by
discussing incipient manifestations of partial enforced self-regulation
models in the aviation, mining, and pharmaceutical industries. Part
IV considers in some detail the weaknesses of the proposed model.
The final Part considers the importance of determining an optimal
mix of regulatory strategies; it concludes that enforced self-regulation could play an important role in such an optimal combination. 6

I.

CONTROLLING CORPORATE CRIME THROUGH
ENFORCED SELF-REGULATION

A. The Theory of Self-Regulation
Self-regulation, whether or not fortified with the refinements proposed by this Article, is an attractive alternative to direct governmental regulation because the state simply cannot afford to do an
adequate job on its own. Fiscal pressures invariably prevent governmental inspectors from regularly checking every workplace for occupational safety offenses, environmental quality lapses, crooked
bookkeeping, or faulty product design.7 The uniformly abysmal inspection programs in these areas and others can and should be im6. During the past four years, I have been undertaking a rather large empirical research
program on corporate crime and business regulation, partly alone and partly in collaboration
with Professor Brent Fisse. Over 200 senior executives in fifty transnational companies, as well
as many government officials, have been interviewed. Throughout this Article, points will be
illustrated by reference to data gleaned from these interviews. Confidentiality was often promised in these discussions as a condition for obtaining more candid information. As a result,
these sources will not be cited. Within the next year, two books providing more detail on
much of the data will appear (J. BRAITHWAITE, CORPORATE CRIME IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL
INDUSTRY (forthcoming); B. FISSE & J. BRAITHWAITE, BUSINESS REGULATION THROUGH
PuBLICITY (tentative title) (forthcoming)).
1. See M. CLINARD & P. YEAGER, supra note 2, at 95-97.
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proved, but they will never reach a satisfactory level. 8
A prograni of self-r€:gulation can dramatically expand coverage.
Under the terms of Section 15A of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934,9 for example, the National Association of Securities Dealers
(NASO) inspects the offices, books, and records of its members for
violations of SEC regulations. In 1968 forty-five percent of NASD
members were inspected under this program. 10 In 1969, by way of
contrast, SEC inspectors surveyed only five-and-a-half percent of the
dealers who were not members of the NASD. 11
Self-regulation can also achieve greater inspectorial depth. In the
international pharmaceutical industry, for example, a number of the
more reputable companies have corporate compliance groups, which
send teams of scientists to audit subsidiaries' compliance with production quality codes. In one Australian subsidiary of an American
firm that I visited, inspections by the headquarters compliance group
were conducted twice yearly and were normally undertaken by three
inspectors who spent over a week in the plant. The government
health department inspection, on the other hand, consisted of an annual one-day visit by a single inspector. While employees had advance warning of the government inspection, the corporate
compliance group arrived unannounced.
Corporate inspectors also tend, at least in the pharmaceutical industry, to be better trained than their government counterparts. 12
Corporate inspectors' specialized knowledge of their employer's
product lines also make them more effective probers than government inspectors, who are forced to be generalists. Their greater technical capacity to spot problems is enhanced by a greater social
capacity to do so. Corporate compliance personnel are more likely
than government inspectors to know where "the bodies were buried," and to be able to detect cover-ups. One American pharmaceutical executive explained in part why this is so:
Our instructions to officers when dealing with FDA inspectors is to
only answer the questions asked, not to provide any extra information,
not to volunteer anything, and not to answer any questions outside
8. Clinard and Yeager note that even if regulatory age!l.cy enforcement budgets were
doubled, ''they would probably still be grossly inefficient to meet inspection and prosecution
needs." Id. at 97.
9. 15
§ 78.-3 (1976).
10. Katz, Industry Se!f-Regulation: A Viable Alternative to Government Regulation, in PROTECTING CONSUMER INTERESTS 161, 167 (R. Katz ed. 1976).
II. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 35TH ANNUAL Rl!PoRT 87-88 (1969),
12. Many internal inspectors, for example, have Ph.Os. See J. BRAITHWAITE, supra note 6
(forthcoming).

u.s.c.
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your area of competence. On the other hand we [the corporate compli. ance staff] can ask anyone anything and expect an answer. They are
told that we are part of the same family, and, unlike the government,
we are working for the same final objectives. 13

The power of corporate inspectors to trap suspected wrongdoers
is often greater than that possessed by government investigators.
One quality assurance manager told me of an instance where this
power was used. His assay" staff was routinely obtaining test results
showing the product to be at full strength. When they found a result
of eighty percent strength, the manager suspected, the laboratory
staff would assume that the assay was erroneous, simply mark the
strength at 100%, and not recalculate the test. The manager's solution was to periodically "spike" the samples with understrength
product to see whether his staff would pick out the defects. If not,
they could be dismissed or sanctioned in some other way. Government inspectors do not have the legal authority to enter a plant and
entrap employees with a spiked production run. 14
We have seen that corporations may be more capable than the
government of regulating their business activities. But if they are
more capable, they are not necessarily more willing to regulate effectively. This is the fundamental weakness of voluntary self-regulation. A voluntary program will stop many violations that cost the
company money and others that are cost-neutral; it will even halt
some violations that benefit the company financially in the shortterm, for the sake of the long-term benefit of fostering employee
commitment to compliance. 15 Recommendations that involve consequences beyond the cost-neutral or short term, however, commonly
will be ignored.
13. Perhaps this statement exaggerates the good will between company employees and internal compliance inspectors. I asked the production manager of the Guatemalan subsidiary
of another company: "Do you think of the internal quality auditors from headquarters a part
of the same team as you?" His answer probably grasped the reality: "I think of them as a pain
in the ass."
14. Another example of the greater effectiveness ofintemal U!5pectors concerns a medical
director who suspected that one of his scientists was "graphiting" safety testing data. His
hunch was that the scientist, whose job was to run 100 trials on a drug, instead ran 10 and
fabricated the other 90 so they would be consistent with the first 10. The medical director
possessed investigative abilities that would have been practically impossible for a governmental investigator. He could verify the number of animals taken from the animal store, the
amount of drug substance that had been used, the number of samples that had been tested, as
well as other facts. His familiarity with the laboratory made this easy. As an insider, he could
probe quietly without raising the kind of alarm that might lead the criminal to pour an appropriate amount of drug substance down the sink.
15. One pharmaceutical quality control director showed me that his firm had failed a batch
of drugs for being slightly overstrength, even though the FDA would have been unlikely to
detect the variation. The director said that the batch was sacrificed to stress to employees the
importance of unswerving adherence to specifications.
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Eeforced self-regulation, on the other hand, can ensure that internal compliance groups will not be lightly overruled. Under the
model proposed by this Article, a compliance director would be required to report to the relevant regulatory agency any management
overruling of compliance group directives. A director who neglected
this duty would be criminally liable. Such a provision would be the
strongest method 16 of ensuring that compliance unit recommendations would be followed by management. Companies that regularly
ignored such directives would fall under the regulatory agency's special scrutiny. The agency could concentrate its limited prosecutorial
resources on companies that continually and irresponsibly disregarded compliance group recommendations. Enforced self-regulation thus combines the versatility and flexibility of voluntary selfregulation, but avoids many of the inherent weaknesses of
voluntarism.
B.

TheModel

The concept of enforced self-regulation is a response both to the
delay, 17 red tape, 18 costs, 19 and stultification of innovation20 that can
result from imposing detailed government regulations on business,
and to the naivete of trusting companies to regulate themselves. 21
Under enforced self-regulation, the government would compel each
company to write a set of rules tailored to the unique set of contingencies facing that firm. A regulatory agency would either approve
these rules or send them back for revision if they were insufficiently
stringent. At this stage in the process, citizens' groups and other interested parties would be encouraged to comment on the proposed
16. Other, weaker, reporting options exist. The compliance group could be statutorily
mandated to report instances of management overruling to the board of directors or to an
audit committee of outside directors.
17. See, e.g., M. WEIDENBAUM, THE FUTURE OF BUSINESS REGULATION (1979); Alexander, It's Roundup Time far the Runaway Regulators, FORTUNE, Dec. 3, 1979, at 12(b).
18. One author, after pointing out that 786 million hours a year are spent in filling out
forms to meet U.S. government reporting requirements, suggested that regulatory agencies
have a "paperwork budget," whereby they submit each year an estimate of the person-hours of
reporting they will impose on the private sector. Neustadt, The Administration's Regulatol)'
Reform Program: An Overview, 32 ADMIN. L. REv. 157 (1980).
19. One estimate placed the costs of regulating American business in 1979 at $4.8 billion.
The costs to industry for complying with regulations was estimated to be nearly $100 billion.
M. WEIDENBAUM, supra note 17, at 22-23.
20. See generally D. SCHWARTZMAN, INNOVATION IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY
(1976); Wardell, The Impact ofRegulation on New .Drug .Development, in IssuES IN PHARMA·
CEUTICAL ECONOMICS 145 (R. Chien ed. 1979); Stewart, Regulation, Innovation, and Adminis•
tratiYe Law: A Conceptual Framework, 69 CALIF. L. REv. 1256 (1981).
21. See R. CRANSTON, CONSUMERS AND THE LAW 61-64 (1979).
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rules. 22 Rather than having governmental inspectors enforce the
rules, most enforcement duties and costs would be internalized by
the company, which would be required to establish its own independent inspectorial group. The primary function of governmental inspectors would be to ensure the independence of this internal
compliance group and to audit its efficiency and toughness. Such
audits would pay particular attention to the number of violators who
had been disciplined by each company. 23 Naturally, old-style direct
government monitoring would still be necessary for firms too small
to afford their own compliance group. ·,
Governmental involvement would not stop at monitoring. Violations of the privately written and publicly ratified rules would be
punishable· by law. This aspect of the enforced self-regulation
model, while perhaps sounding radical, is actually not as extreme as
it first might seem. Regulatory agencies would not ratify private
rules unless the regulations were consonant with legislatively enacted
minimum standards.24
22. Citizen participation in the rulemaking process, under the aegis of the Administrative
Procedures Act, is a current feature of the direct governmental regulation process. See 5
U.S.C. §§ 553-557 (1976). Public input can be either in the form of comments submitted to an
agency or hearing testimony. This Article advocates retention of such a feature in a system of
enforced self-regulation. There are, however, costs involved, especially in the delays that can
be expected in receiving and assessing public input. q: Noll, Breaking Out ofthe Regulatory
Dilemma: Alternatives lo the Sterile Choice, 51 IND. L.J. 686, 687 (1976) (noting that in 1973,
the Atomic Energy Commission took an average six months to approve nuclear power plant
construction permits when no one but the applicant participated in the process; the average
delay was 29 months when an intervenor was granted full standing).
23. This would include a statistical monitoring of the relative frequency with which sanctions of different severity (dismissal, demotion, fine, suspension of bonus, referral for criminal
prosecution) were imposed by each company.
24. To say that rules would be rejected if they failed to meet a minimum standard is not to
say that the goal of the approval process ought to be standards as uniform as possible.
It can be argued that striving for uniformity of standards under enforced self-regulation
would not be desirable. Viscusi and Zeckhauser, in Optimal Standards with Incomplete Enforcement, 27 PUB. POLY. 437 (1979), have developed the following persuasive rationale for
nonuniformity. People normally assume that the higher the standards set by government for
pollution, safety, and the like, the better will be industry's performance in meeting these criteria. Viscusi and Zeckhauser show formally that this is not the case. It is not so because whenever a standard is set, some firms will decide that the costs of compliance with it are greater
than the costs of noncompliance (the probability of detection multiplied by the costs if detected). As standards are made more stringent, the costs of compliance increase steeply while
the costs of noncompliance remain more or less constant. Hence, as standards become more
stringent, the performance of firms that comply improves, but additional firms choose to risk
penalties for noncompliance. Viscusi and Zeckhauser thus demonstrate that at some point,
further tightening of a standard may lower overall performance. But this point will be different for different types of firms. For firms with enormous sunk costs in old plants, the costs of
compliance will be greater than for firms about to construct their factories.
Because of economies of scale in pollution control, the point at which further tightening of
standards will increase the output of pollution may be higher for large firms than for small
ones. In other words, the environment and the public may be better protected by nonuniform
standards. Hence, nonuniformity under enforced self-regulation could be an advantage. More
stringent rules could be demanded of firms with lower compliance costs. In some ways, EPA
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There are a number of ways that a legislature could frame broad
statements that were not at the same time platitudinous. Consider,
for example, an act to set guidelines for the Federal Mine Safety and
Health Administration to follow in approving rules written by coal
companies. The Act might recognize in its preamble that the minimum level of safety guaranteed_ by the Federal Coal Mine Safety
and Health Act of 1977 was unsatisfactorily low and instruct the Administration not to approve any corporate safety rules that do not
guarantee better safety performance than that ensured by the 1977
Act. Recognizing that. American coal miners are three times more
likely than British miners to be killed at work, 25 the Act might further instruct the Administration not to accept the existing "state of
the art" in safety standards. As a third option,26 the Administration
could be directed to structure its approval process so as to halve coal
mine fatality and injury rates by a certain year.
The government need not, moreover, adopt this performance target approach to setting overarching standards. In empowering the
Securities and Exchange Commission to ratify accounting rules for
individual companies, for example, Congress might ijst a number of
criteria that all sets of accounting rules must satisfy. For environmental rulemaking, the legislature might define a level of ecological
threat that is intolerable under all circumstances. The standards
could even specify a range of cost-benefit or cost-effectiveness ratios
for proposed rules. These examples are not presented to evaluate the
many ways in which the ultimate authority of the legislature might
limit private rulemaking; they are presented only to show that such
already accepts this principle by requiring more stringent emission controls on new
automobiles than on those already on the road, and by requiring pollution control technology
to be installed in new plants, controls not demanded of old ones. Theoretically, enforced self•
regulation makes possible nonuniform optimal standards which would give greater protection
than any (stricter or more lenient) uniform standard.
25. The most recent comparable statistics are for "fatalities per thousand employed" in
underground mining in 1974. The British fatality rate was 0.19 compared with 0.75 for the
United States. Lewis-Beck & Alford, Can Government Regulate Sqftty? The Coal Mine Example, 14 AM. PoL. Ser. REv. 745, 755 n.7 (1980).
26. Other possible approaches exist. For example, the preamble to the standards might
draw attention to the variable performance of different companies to give broad guidance.
Westmoreland Coal was found by the President's Commission on Coal to have an injury rate
of 21 lost workday cases per 200,000 hours in its 29 underground min~. In contrast, United
States Steel maintained an injury rate of3 in its 28 underground mines'. Five of the largest 20
coal producers maintained rates lower than 6 lost workday injuries per 200,000 work hours.
THE PRESIDENTS COMMISSION ON COAL, STAFF REPoRT: THE ACCEYrABLE REPLACEMENT
OF IMPORTED OIL WITH COAL 42 (1980). Hence, the legislation could point to the safety per-

formance of these five companies as a more appropriate yardstick: The regulatory agency
would be instructed to satisfy itself that company rules, and the enforcement of them, were
sufficiently stringent to cause it to expect an average atµunment of fewer than 6 lost workday
injuries per 200,000 work hours.
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authority can be exercised in a variety of ways, depending on the
circumstances of the regulated industry.
C. An Illustration: Regulating Corporate Accounting Standards

To illustrate the advantages of enforced self-regulation, let us examine the problems inherent in regulating one important aspect of
business practice - corporate accounting. Recognizing that companies can use misleading accounting practices and conceal their assets
to evade taxes, most nations provide for the prosecution of firms that
fail to report ''true and fair" accounts or to use "accepted accounting
standards."27 To call such bland admonishments "standards" is to
stretch meaning. Their very amorphousness hinders prosecution.
Defendant corporations have little difficulty in finding eminent accounting experts to pronounce their practices professionally acceptable because every accountant has a different conception of what is
"true and fair" or what constitutes an "accepted accounting
standard."28
Unhappy prosecutors can appeal to the legislature for more
tightly defined standards, but this may lead to overspecification. No
single set of detailed government-imposed standards will satisfy the
efficiency requirements of backyard businesses and· transnational
corporations, banks and manufacturers, or holding companies and
operating concerns. A company's accounts are a vital tool in evaluating investments and in making other management decisions. Accounts made too subservient to public purposes will be less efficient
for private purposes. When required to develop standards to govern
accounts, therefore, legislatures around the world have generally
opted for the unenforceability of blandness rather than for the inefficiency of overspecification.29 ·
How can enforced self-regulation resolve this dilemma? Each
company would be required to write its own accounting rules. These
rules should enable the company to meet its operational requirements while ensuring public accountability and acceptable comparability with the accounts of othe.r companies. Once these rules had
been ratified by the appropriate agency and made available to investors, any yiolation 9f them would, by definition, constitute an unacceptable accounting practice and be punishable by law. By tyip.g the
specificity of the rules to the unique circumstances of the company
27. See International Standards of Accounting and Reporting, 4 U.N. Commission on
Transnational Corporations (Agenda Item 9(b)), U.N. Doc. E/C.10/33 (1977).
28. See A. BRILOFF, UNACCOUNTABLE ACCOUNTING 6 (1972).
29. See International Standards, supra note 27.
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for which they were written, fairness in accounts would be rendered
enforceable. Specificity can replace blandness without the overspecification inherent in universalistic standards. In addition to the
familiar practice of holding outside audits, internal audit groups
would be mandated. Enforced self-regulation might therefore produce simple specific rules which would make possible both more efficient, comparable accounting and easier conviction of violators.
II.

STRENGTHS OF THE ENFORCED SELF-REGULATION MODEL

A. Rules Would Be Tailored To Match the Company
An efficient system of corporate regulation would acknowledge
the social risks and social benefits associated with the activities of
each regulated company and provide rules appropriate to those characteristics. Under direct governmental regulation, such adaptability
over the wide spectrum of business types and sizes is impossible.
Government has responded to this problem in two radically different
ways: It has either tried to obtain specificity by generating rules that
are gargantuan in length and complexity, or written rules for the
lowest common denominator of proscribed behavior, as exemplified
by the bland platitudes of corporate accounting standards.Jo The resulting universalistic rules often impose unnecessary strictures. on
some companies and overly lax restrictions on others. Regulations
mandating a certain hazard-reducing technology, while forcing less
responsible companies to upgrade to this standard, can also cause
industry leaders to adopt this fix when, left to their own devices, they
would have installed a technology superior in both hazard reduction
and economy of scale.JI Rules that strive for universal applicability
cannot avoid some particularistic irrationality.J2
Legal institutions are designed to be stable and predictable, while
economic entities ideally are rapidly adaptable to changing
economic and technological trends. Universalistic laws cannot be
quickly altered to reflect changing events lest some critical circumstance be ignored among the infinite array of possible conditions to
which the rules might be applied. But enforced self-regulation is by
30. See text at notes 27-28 supra.
31. Executives of the companies that are leaders in quality control and toxicological meth•
odology in the pharmaceutical industry have complained to me that the FDA's Good Manufacturing Practices and Good Laboratory Practices regulations at times forced them to adopt
what they considered second-best control techniques.
32. For an account of how the national imposition of a particular pollution abatement
technology resulted in some companies' switching to high sulfur coal, so that their aggregate
output of pollution actually increased, see Ackerman & Hassler, Beyond the New .Deal: Coal
and the Clean Air Act, 89 YALE J,.J. 1466 (1980).
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definition tailored to the particular needs and functions of each corporation.33 The rules written need relate only to a limited set of economic and structural circumstances rather than to a vast, incoherent
range of business activities. The environmental protection regulations to be followed by a self-employed chemicals wholesaler, for
example, need not be as complex as those governing a Dow or a
duPont. Because rules under a system of enforced self-regulation are
particularistic, an agency charged with approving those rules need
not account for all of the loophole-opening strategies used by different companies to duck their regulatory responsibilities. 34
In short, under enforced self-regulation, rules could be both simpler and have greater specificity of meaning. The dangers of complexity and blandness are easily avoided when rules relate to a finite
and known set of circumstances rather than to an infinite and unknowable range of business activities.

B. Rules Would Adjust More Quickly to Changing
Business Environments

A primary reason for the failure oflaw to control corporate crime
is that legal institutions are made to last, while economic institutions
are designed for rapid adaptation to changing economic and technological realities. Universalistic laws cannot, or at least should not, be
rushed through lest they are later found to create more problems
than they solve through having failed to consider some critical circumstance among the infinite array of possible conditions to which
they might be applied.
Because particularistic rules have less profound ramifications
than universalistic rules, they can be tinkered with more frequently.
When a new threat is perceived to the public interest (e.g., research
discovers a new industrial carcinogen), years of delay can be expected as universalistic rules are drafted and redrafted to meet objections from the disparate types of industries which would be
differentially affected by the proposed rule. 35 Lengthy consideration
33. See Fisse, The Social Polic,y of Corporate Criminal Responsibility, 6 ADEL. L. REv. 38285 (1978), for a discussion of various reasons why internal rulemaking presents advantages in
simplicity and enforceability over external rulemaking. See also Amsterdam, Perspectives on
the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349, 417-39 (1974), in which Prof. Amsterdam argues that rules of conduct written by police departments themselves are likely to be more
refined than rules conferred externally because thay are drawn up and modified by people in
touch with the day-to-day realities of implementation.
34. For example, legislation rushed through to close one loophole might be used by sharp
corporate attorneys to justify a principle which enables them to open a new .loophole
elsewhere.
35. The classic illustration of such regulatory paralysis is the National Highway Traffic
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must be given to the now almost inevitable pleas by some firms that
they would be forced out of business by the new rules. In contrast,
under enforced self-regulation, as immediately as the threat was perceived, all companies would be required to write new, more stringent
rules to meet the threat. Of course, companies which feared the
financial repercussions of the new controls could be expected to
write rules insufficiently stringent to satisfy government requirements. A lengthy process of redrafting and negotiation would commence with those firms. But while this was going on, the majority of
firms which were willing and able to introduce satisfactory protections would be following their new rules. Under traditional regulation, these firms would be waiting until the final form of the
regulations was decided before investing in new controls. Even
those firms which chose to write rules insufficiently stringent might ·
be giving improved protection during the negotiating period if they
were following their improved, but still inadequate, standards.
Probably the most important factor enabling particularistic rules
to be adjusted more rapidly is that precedent would not be as important as it is under universalism. A pharmaceutical company which
abandoned a quality control test iI1- favor of a completely new, more
effective, in-process approach to building in quality could be permitted to immediately change its rules to accommodate this innovation
under enforced self-regulation. Under traditional regulation, in contrast, the regulatory agency would be slow in deliberating whether
allowing this company to abandon the old test would lead to a flood
of demands from other concerns that they too be allowed to do away
with it (even though they had not introduced any alternative controls). The regulatory agency would have to consider whether any
pending court cases turning on the validity of the old rule might be
lost if the defendants could show that the agency had selectively
waived the rule. Under enforced self-regulation, where companies
are prosecuted only for violations of their own rules, this kind of
precedent would not be an issue.

C. Regulatory Innovation Would Be Fostered
It has already been implied that governments freed of anxiety
over allowing dangerous precedents would be more permissive of
radical new approaches to the control of harmful practices or
Safety Administration, established in 1966 to set standards. By 1981, only two had been established: one in 1972 on side impacts, and another in 1977 on gasoline tank safety. See DeGeorge, Ethical Responsibilities of Engineers in Large Organizations: The Pinto Care, l Bus. &
PR.OF. ETHICS 9 (1981).
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processes. Regulations written in 1982 will tend to ossify control
techniques, be they environmental or financial, at the state of the art
as of 1982. Enforced self-regulation, in comparison, would tap the
managerial genius within top corporations to design custom-made
regulatory systems. At all times it would be possible for cheaper and
more.effective modes of contrQl to emerge. Ultimately, more effective approaches to such problems as reducing pollution and assuring
product and workplace safety will result from depending on the creative expertise of the private sector, rather than on the more limited
reservoir of talent in the bureaucracy. If innovation is encouraged,
however, there is also a price to be paid; some technological and
managerial "improvements" will prove less effective than existing
techniques. A combination of regulatory vigilance and civil liability
for damages to victims would have to be counted on to control the
excesses of experimentation.

D. Rules Would Be More Comprehensive in Their Coverage
Three empirical studies36 of internal rulemaking and enforcement in fifty large companies have convinced me that internal corporate rules invariably cover a much wider range of industrial hazards
and corporate abuses than do governmental regulations. While large
companies manage to write. rules regulating a substantial proportion
of the most serious harms or wrongs that could occur in their business, governments simply do not. They fail because they lack the
time, research resources, and political will necessary to build consensus around a comprehensive set of rules. Instead of dealing
forthrightly with their failure to achieve broad regulatory coverage,
governments trust firms to regulate themselves voluntarily under the
tens of thousands of nongovernmental standards written by trade associations, professional and technical societies, and similar bodies.37
By giving public recognition to private corporate rules, enforced selfregulation could extend the law to cover a wider range of highly
dangerous practices.
The failure of government consensus-building to reconcile conflicts over rules can also subject companies to the demands of two
agencies wit:4 conflicting goals. This can be demonstrated by the di36. The studies will be published as J. BRAITHWAITE, supra note 6 (forthcoming); J.
BRAITHWAITE, COST-EFFECTIVE BUSINESS REGULATION (1981); B. FISSE & J. BRAITHWAITE,
supra note 6 (forthcoming).
•
37. See Hamilton, Tlte Role of Nongovernmental Standards in tlte .Development of·
Mandatory Federal Standards Affecting Sofety or Health, 56 TEXAS L. R.Ev. 1329 (1978); Page,
Self Regulation and Codes ofPractice, 1. Bus. L., Jan. 1980, at 24.
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lemma faced by some Australian meat packing houses. The companies are trapped in a dispute over how often floors should be washed.
Health authorities, concerned only with the cleanliness of the food
being processed, require regular wash-downs. Occupational safety
officials, worried about the safety of workers carrying sharp instruments on wet floors, want the surfaces kept dry. While the agencies
bicker over their regulatory authority, the resulting stalemate benefits neither the consuming public nor workers. Under enforced selfregulation, each slaughterhouse could be given wide discretion to
write (in consultation with employee representatives) its own floorwashing rules. Though the respective agencies could still disagree on
the relative importance of dry floors versus clean floors, less political
will would be required to grant the company discretion to suggest
their own way out of the stalemate than would be needed to force
consensus between the agencies. As mentioned above, regulatory
agencies at present have no choice but to vigilantly guard against
compromises which set dangerous precedents; under enforced selfregulation they can be more flexible because precedents will not
come back to haunt them. In too many areas, necessary regulations
gather dust in the "too-hard" basket because of the consensus-building demands of the direct regulation model.
E.

Companies Would Be More Committed
to Rules They Wrote

As John Kenneth Galbraith has noted, "[n]othing in American
business attitudes is so iniquitous as government interference in the
internal affairs of the corporation."38 If business is responsible for
writing and enforcing its own code of conduct, the notion of regulation may become more palatable.
Many corporations are currently alienated from a sense of social
responsibility. In highly regulated industries, there can be an attitude of unconcern about corporate abuses that government inspectors do not discover. A senior Australian executive of an
international drug company, for example, claimed that "it is the responsibility of the Health Department to work out whether research
results have been cheated on. Maybe ifwe do fudge some result, it's
the job of the Health Department to find that out. It's not our responsibility. That's their job." Or, to quote an American
counterpart:
Often our people use the FDA to get out of making a decision them38. J.K.

GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE

77 (1967) (emphasis in original),
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selves on a drug. We find it very hard to reach consensus among ourselves on the safety of a product and often there are strong
disagreements among us. So sometimes we get out of making our own
decision by putting it to the FDA and letting them decide for us. 39
Irresponsible companies are frequently pleased to hand over incomplete facts to facilitate the government's regulatory decision; if
the agency gives them a green light, they delightedly claim, "It's
within the rules, so let's go ahead."
Such abdication ofresponsibility could be minimized by the joint
participation of company and government in a rulemaking program.
When the company writes the laws it is more difficult for it to rationalize illegality by reference to the law's being an ass. Considerable
evidence indicates, moreover, that participation in a decision-making process increases the acceptance and improves the execution of
the decisions reached.40 As company and government work together
to design workable rules, mutual suspicions may diminish. Of
course, commitment to self-generated rules will be less pronounced
when an agency vetoes the initial rules proposed by a company and
ultimately approves regulations that the company views as less than
optimal.

F. The Confusion and Costs That Flow from Having Two
Rulebooks (the Government's and the Company's) Would
Be Reduced
Under enforced self-regulation, it would be no longer necessary
for a company to undergo the costs and confusion of having to follow two rulebooks - the government's and its own. This problem is
particularly acute in transnational subsidiaries, where the host g6vernment's rules may be framed in fundamentally different terms
from the rules imposed by corporate headquarters. Obviously the
fusing of corporate and host government rules would rarely be painless; in many situations governments would insist that corporate regulations be modified to conform to local requirements. But
governments should concede the validity of totally different approaches to control developed in other countries. Japanese pharmaceutical companies, for example, have adopted an approach to
toxicology testing for dangerous side-effect~ of drugs that differs rad39. Statements made during interviews with the author.
40. Professor Vroom has reviewed the empirical evidence from organizational research
showing that, other things being equal, "the participation of individuals or of groups in decisions which affect them appears to be positively related to their acceptance of decisions and to
the efficiency with which decisions are executed." Vroom, Industrial Social Psychology, in S
HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 196, 237 (G. Lindzey & E. Aronson 2d ed. 1969).
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ically from the Western toxicology tradition. Enforced self-regulation might permit a Japanese company operating in the United
States to follow its worldwide drug safety standards instead of Western requirements that are thoroughly incompatible with its corporate
rules. By allowing the company to preserve the integrity of its total
quality assurance and safety testing package, enforced self-regulation might better protect the public.
G. Business Would Bear More

of the Costs of Its Own Regulation

Enforced self-regulation, by placing the principal inspectorial
burden on internal -compliance groups, also allocates most of the
costs for such regulation to private industry. This is only equitable.
If industry profits from its misdeeds, why should it not bear the costs
of controlling them? Economic efficiency is also furth~red by forcing
companies to internalize regulatory costs. If such costs are not included in the price of its products, the price will not fully reflect the
social cost of producing it, and the demand for the product will exceed that which would optimize social utility.41
H. More Offenders Would Be Caught More Oflen

In the above section on ''The Theory of Self-Regulation," a variety of reasons were advanced to explain why self-regulation results
in broader inspectorial coverage by inspectors , with a greater
capability for discovering violations. 42 Though internal compliance
groups can be expected to catch more offenders than government
inspectors, they cannot be counted upon to send the offenders to
courts of law for prosecution with the frequency which we expect of
government inspectors. ~easons exist, however, to believe that internal discipline would not be less effective.
41. Professor Mishan has explained the economic rationale for J,Daking firms assume the
burden of externalities:
The operations of firms, or the doings of ordinary people, frequently have significant effects on others of which no account need be taken by the firms, or th~. individuals, responsible for them. Moreover, inasmuch as the benefits conferred and the damages inflicted or 'external economies' and 'external diseconomies' respectively - on oilier members of
society in the process of producing, or using, certain goods do not enter the calculation of
the market price, one can no longer take it for granted that the market price of a good is
an index of its marginal value to society.
. . . It follows that an apparently efficiently working competitive ec;onomy, one in which
outputs are quickly adjusted so that prices everywhere tend to equalprivate marginal cost,
may lead the economy very far indeed from an optimal position as defined. Such an
optimal position in fact requires that in all sectors production be such that ptjces are equal
to social marginal cost.
E. MlsHAN, THE COSTS OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 82-83 (1969).
42. See notes 7-16 supra and accompanying text.
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1. Offenders 1Vho Were Caught Would .Be Subjected To Internal
.Discpline In a Larger Proportion ef Cases Than Under
Traditional Government Regulation
Under enforced self-regulation, companies with strong records of
disciplining their employees would be rewarded as showing up well
in government audits of the toughness of internal compliance systems; existing public enforcement, in contrast, gives companies incentives to cover up and protect their guilty employees. Internal discipline is in many ways more potent than government prosecution
because internal enforcers <l:o not have to surmount the hurdle of
proof beyond reasonable doubt, and do not have to cut through a
conspiracy of diffused accountability within the organization.43 Corporations in the past have protected their individual members from
prosecution by presenting a confused picture of the allocation of responsibility to the outside world. My research on the pharmaceutical industry concluded, however, that companies have two kinds of
records: those designed to allocate guilt (for internal purposes), and
those for obscuring guilt (for presentation to the outside world):
When companies want clearly defined accountability they can generally get it. Enforced self-regulation would compel companies to use
this capability in the public interest. Direct government regulation
provides disincentives for nominated accountability, because nominated accountability puts heads on the prosecutor's chopping block;
enforced self-regulation provides incentives for nominated accountability because corporations which cannot demonstrate that they are
conducting their own executions would be singled out for
inquisition.

J. It Would .Be Easier For Government Prosecutors To Obtain
Corporate Crime Convictions
It has been concluded under sections 11-H and II-I that the
greatly increased number of discovered violations under enforced
self-regulation would be regularly the subject of internal disciplinary
action but rarely of public prosecution. Even though internal compliance groups would not "call the cops" in normal circumstances,
there are other features of the enforced self-regulation approach
which would make it reasonable to expect more potent public as well
as private enforcement. Essentially, there are three reasons for predicting that more suspects would be convicted under enforced selfregulation than under direct regulation.
43. See, e.g., note 14.rupra.
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. (i)

Because bland and meaningless rules (e.g. that accounts be
'true and fair') would be replaced by precise and particularistic rules,44 acquittals would be more difficult to secure
by appeal to the vagaries of the wording.
Universalistic
rulemaking tends to complexity because the
(ii)
rules must evolve to deal with the infinity of circumstances
encountered throughout the entire economy. The more
complex the law becomes, the more will powerful organizations exploit that complexity by finding loopholes, protracting proceedings and otherwise evading the spirit of the
law. 45 Under simple particularistic rules, this capacity of
company lawyers to exploit complexity would be
diminished.
(iii) In cases where the recommendations of the internal compliance group were defied this fact would be communicated
to the regulatory agency. Their reports would then be powerful ammunition for the prosecutor to put before the
court. The contents of the compliance group report would
also direct the prosecutor to the most valuable insiders to
subpoena.
K.

Compliance Would Become the Path of Least
Corporate Resistance

Requiring compliance directors to report management refusals to
heed their recommendations would pressure executives to comply
with those recommendations. For most offenses, the cost of yielding
to the compliance director would be less than the costs of fighting the
investigation, prosecution, and adverse publicity that would almost
certainly follow rejection of the compliance group's recommendations.46 And if the agency succeeded in its action, the courts would
44. See notes 33 & 34 supra and accompanying text.
45. The more complex the web of law becomes, the more possible it is for company lawyers to use the doctrines implicit in one part of the law as a justification for actions that evade
other parts of the same body of law. For a general discussion of rule complexity and its exploitation, see Sutton & Wild, Corporate Crime and Social Structure, in Two FACES OF DEVI·
ANCE 177 (P. Wilson & J. Braithwaite eds. 1978); Braithwaite, Inegalitarian Consequences oj"
Egalitarian Reforms to Control Corporate Crime, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 1127, 1136-40 (1980).
46. Consider, for example, one of the most significant environmental prosecutions in the
United States - the Kepone water pollution case against Allied Chemical. If an internal
compliance group had been in place, had told top management about the violations, and had
threatened to report them to the EPA, there can be little doubt that remedial action would
have been taken. Kepone earned its maker only $600,000 in profits a year; its unlawful dispersal into the James River ultimately cost Allied almost $30 million in fines, legal fees, settlements, and voluntary restitutive efforts. See B. F1ssE & J. BRAITHWAITE, supra note 6,
The other reason that an enforced self-regulation scheme would have resulted in immedi-
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compel the company to comply with the recommendations originally
suggested by the compliance unit. Large corporations have an almost obsessive desire to prevent their dirty linen from being washed
in public.47 Even when top management believes that it could prevail in court, it might still yield to the compliance group rather than
display a rift between the two sections of the company in full view of
shareholders, financial institutions, and other key reference groups.
On the debit side, then, the compliance directors' statutory obligation to report a failure to rectify could conceivably give them so
much clout as to lead to an "over-compliance" whereby management allowed itself to be pushed further than the rules ever intended.
III.

INCIPIENT MANIFESTATIONS OF THE ENFORCED SELFREGULATION MODEL

Two key elements underlie the enforced self-regulation concept:
(a) public enforcement of privately written rules; and (b) publicly
mandated and publicly monitored private enforcement of those
rules. Each element already exists in a variety of regulatory areas,
but there is no manifestation of both in a comprehensive enforced
self-regulation scheme.
Every country in the world publicly enforces private rules in its
regulation of civil aviation safety.48 Before an airline flies a new
route, the altitude of its approaches, the flight path, survival equipment to be carried on board, and other operating procedures must be
approved by the national civil aviation authority concerned. The
rules are not universal but are tailor-made for the particular flight;
the company writes them, and the government ratifies them and
ate rectification is that top management only became aware of the violations late in the game.
Allied's chief executive officer, for example, did not know so much as what Kepone was until
the scandal broke. (Information based on private interview data). This points up an additional reason why middle managers would submit to the compliance director: Once a regulatory agency had co=enced a prosecution, with its attendant public disclosure, the attention
of top management would be drawn to those middle-level executives. Their jobs would not
long be secure. For a discussion of the greater costs involved in publicly fighting cases rather
than quietly settling (even when the corporation is innocent), see ~offee, Corporate Punishment, supra note 4, at 402-03.
41. See generally B. FISSE & J. BRAITHWAITE, supra note 6; Fisse, The Use ofPublicity as a
Criminal Sanction Against Business Corporations, 8 MELB. U. L. REv. 107 (1971).
48. On the regulation of civil aviation, see, e.g., AVIATION STATISTICS CENTRE, TRANSP. &
PUB. UTIL. DIV., STATISTICS CANADA, AVIATION IN CANADA 1971, at 34-37 (1972); BUSINESS
AND DEFENSE SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, WORLD SURVEY OF
CIVIL AVIATION: CONTINENTAL EUROPE AND IRELAND (1965); D. HOCKING & C. liADDONCAVE, AIR TRANSPORT IN AUSTRALIA 75 (1951). The violation of such privately written and
publicly ratified rules concerning minimum safe altitudes was a major issue in the inquiry into
the crash of an Air New Zealand plane with 257 people aboard in Antarctica. See 'Incompetent Administrative Procedures' Cited in Crash Report, AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECH., July 6,
1981, at 34.
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punishes deviation from their strictures. Violations of such rules in
Australia, for example, are punishable by imprisonment as well as
by fines or license revocation. 49
Perhaps the most highly developed version of this aspect of enforced self-regulation can be found in the Federal Mine Safety and
Health Act of 1977.50 Section IOI(c) of the Act provides:
Upon petition by the operator or the representative of miners, the Secretary may modify the application of any mandatory safety standard to
a coal or other mine if the Secretary determines that an alternative
method of achieving the result of such standard exists which will at all
times guarantee no less than the same measure of protection afforded
the miners of such mine by such standard, or that the application of
such standard to such mine will result in a diminution of safety to the
miners in such mine. 51

Since 1977, about 600 petitions for modification (some of them involving packages of standards) have been granted by the Mine
Safety and Health Administration. In a few instances, civil fines
have been assessed against companies that violated the particularistic standards approved under a petition for modification. However,
officials believe that citations for such violations are rare because of
the companies' commitment to rules that they have sought themselves. The program is not without regulatory cost; each petition
consumes roughly three-person days for investigation and
approval. 52
The Mine Safety and Health Administration regulations53 also
permit mine operators to submit their own plans for ventilation54
and dust control,55 and roof support56 for the agency's approval. The
latter is particularly significant since roof falls are the leading cause
of fatal accidents in mines. 57 In setting down the criteria to be followed in approving roof control plans, the regulations separately de49. See 1981 Aust!. Stat. R., §§ 212-14, 312 (as amended Sept. 4, 1981) (regulations under
the Air Navigation Act, 1920-74) l Acrs. AUSTL. P. 143.
50. 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-23, 824-902, 921-924, 925-34, 936-60 (Supp. I 1977, Supp. II 1978 &
Supp. III 1979) (as amended).
51. Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-164, § IOI(c), 91 Stat.
1294 (codified at 30 U.S.C. § 8II(c) (Supp. I 1977)).
52. Information gleaned from interviews conducted by the author with mine safety
officials.
53. 30 C.F.R. §§ 70.1-90.301 (1981).
54. 30 C.F.R. § 75.300-.330-1 (1981).
55. 30 C.F.R. § 75.400-.404 (1981).
56. 30 C.F.R. § 75.200-.205 (1981).
57. U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, ANNUAL REPORT AND ACHIEVEMENTS (pt. I) 27 (1978).
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fine standards for seven different types of roof support techniques. 58
Additionally, mine owners are free to devise their own unique roof
control plans. 59 These regulations constitute an impressive example
of how firm criteria to limit administrative discretion can be
designed in the face of a variety of technologies, the appropriateness
of which depends on the circumstances of a particular mine.
Since December 1979, companies have been criminally convicted
in several cases that turned in part on deviations from approved roof
control plans. 60 In one of these cases, a mine official of the
Vanhoose Coal Company was sentenced to sixty days imprisonment
for failing to comply with a roof control plan that the Labor Department had approved. 61 This offense was responsible for a roof fall in
which one Vanhoose miner died and another was injured. It is to the
best of my knowledge the only case in which an executive has been
imprisoned for noncompliance with privately written, publicly ratified rules.
The appropriateness of enforced self-regulation to coal mine
safety is patent. As one coal mining official suggested: "The last
four major disasters in this country could be attributed to a weak
plan." While violations of specific standards were a problem, the
fundamental cause of the disasters was poor execution of a total
safety plan. Enforced self-regulation would focus attention on the
overall plan, and not simply on the quality of single standards.
Some of the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) enforcement activities also approach the enforced self-regulation model. Indeed, in one important respect, the agency has gone beyond the
approach envisaged by this Article. The Clean Water Act62 authorizes civil penalties of $5000 per day for deviations from privately
written oil spillage rules that have not been publicly rati:fi.ed.63 The
58. The categories of roof support plans are: full roof bolting, 30 C.F.R. § 75.200-07; conventional roof control, 30 C.F.R. § 75.200-08; combination roof control, 30 C.F.R. § 75.200-09;
spot roof bolting, 30 C.F.R. § 75.200-11; special roof control, 30 C.F.R. § 75.200-12; and temporary support, 30 C.F.R. § 75.200-13:
59. Roof control plans which do not conform to these criteria [see note 58 supra] may be
approved providing the operator can satisfy the District Manager that the resultant roof
conditions will provide no less than the same measure of protection to the miners.
30 C.F.R. § 75.200-06 (1981).
60. United States v. Wyatt, CR 81-00029 (W.D. Va. plea entered Apr. 29, 1981); United
States v. Vanhoose Coal Co. Inc. No. l Mine, CR 81-4 (E.D. Ky.plea entered Apr. 15, 1981);
United States v. United Castle Coal Co. No. 1 Mine, CR 80-00093 (W.D. Va.plea entered Apr.
9, 1981); United States v. J. & P. Coal Co., CR 80-0060 (W.D. Va.plea entered Sept. 8, 1980).
61. United States v. Vanhoose Coal Co. No. l Mine, No. 81-4 (E.D. Ky.plea entered Apr.
15, 1981).
62. Codified in scattered sections of 33 U.S.C. (1976).
63. 40 C.F.R. § 114.1 (1981).
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EPA regulations require companies involved in the production, distribution, or storage of oil to prepare a Spill Prevention Control or
Countermeasure Plan. 64 The companies must follow agency guidelines in preparing the plan, but their plans are reviewed by the EPA
only if a spill actually occurs. In normal circumstances, the plan
need only be certified by a Professional Engineer, who must attest
that the plan accords with good engineering practices. 65
In another area of EPA regulation, the District of Columbia Circuit has upheld civil penalties imposed on the Chrysler Corporation
for violating the terms of a certificate of conformity with emission
controls under the Clean Air Act. 66 The certificate is, in effect, a
license to sell vehicles issued after approval of an application listing
vehicle parameters and specifications that reasonably may be expected to affect emissions. Chrysler was penalized for violating some
of these specifications. The corporation appealed, claiming that regardless of the breach of the certificate's terms, the emissions of its
• vehicles remained within federal standards. In finding against the
corporation, the court upheld an important principle: The integrity
of particularistic standards must be sustained even when full compliance with them proved unnecessary to attain the overarching standards that gave them birth.
In short, then, there are already powerful examples of public enforcement of privately written rules. But the full enforced self-regulation model requires more; it also mandates governmentally
monitored internal enforcement of the internally written rules. The
closest incipient approximation is governmentally monitored internal enforcement of externally written regulations. The leading illustration is the enforcement of Good Laboratory Practices (GLP) rules
imposed on pharmaceutical companies by the Food and Drug
Administration.
GLPs were first promulgated in 197867 after it was alleged that
pharmaceutical companies replaced animals that developed unhealthy conditions during drug-testing experiments. The regulations
seek to render fraud more difficult by requiring strict record keeping68 and unswerving adherence to scientific protocols.69 Most interestingly, the GLPs require each drug testing laboratory to have a
64.
65.
66.
61.
68.
69.

40 C.F.R. § 112.1-07 (1981).
40 C.F.R. § 112.3(d) (1981). The criteria can be found in 40 C.F.R. § 112.7 (1981),
United States v. Chrysler Corp., 591 F.2d 958 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
See 43 Fed. Reg. 60,013 (1978).
21 C.F.R. § 58.185-.195 (1981).
21 C.F.R. § 58.120-.130 (1981).
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Quality Assurance Unit (QA(J) that acts as an internal compliance
policeman.70 This feature was designed to shift the financial burden
of regulation from government to the companies. Quality Assurance Unit status reports must routinely be placed before the study
director and management of the company.71 This ensures that management can not plead ignorance when it fails to act on reports of
violations. 'If management does not know about the discovered violations, the company is guilty of an offense for not knowing. The
regulations thus enforce a self-regulatory mechanism to prevent underlings from .filtering bad news before it reaches responsible ears.72
The decision to throw the major burden of regulation onto an
internal QAU raised some thorny issues, however. Industry argued
that if QAUs had to make their findings available to the FDA, then
their effectiveness as a management tool to ensure the quality of research would be undermined. A QAU which knew that its comments would be read by FDA officials (and by consumer groups,
which could get the comments from the FDA under the Freedom of
Information Act) would be less than frank in its reports to management. QAU reports would become a public relations function of the
company rather than a compliance function. The FDA was persuaded by this argument and decided that, as a matter of administrative policy, inspectors would not request reports of findings and
problems uncovered by the QAU or records of corrective actions recommended and taken. 73 FDA inspectors still audit the QAU to ensure that it has effective compliance systems in place and to check
certain objective compliance criteria. But the records available for
70. 21 C.F.R. § 58.35 (1981).
71. 21 C.F.R. § 58.35(b)(4) (1981).
72. [T]here is a natural tendency for "bad news" of any sort not to rise to the top in an
organization. A screening process takes place, such that if a company has been touting a
new drug, and the drug begins "experiencing difficulties" in the lab, lab employees and
their supervisors just "know'' that information about this is to be passed upward, if at all,
only in the vaguest terms. If an automobile company has retooled and is geared to produce 500,000 units of some car, a test driver or his supervisor knows that information
suggesting that the car turns over too easily is not going to be welcomed "upstairs."
Worse still, certain sorts of wrongdoing of a more serious sort - for example, price-fixing
or other criminal activity - is not just screened out casually; it becomes the job of someone, perhaps the general counsel, to intercept any such information that could "taint" his
president or board chairman, divulging his suspicions only in private, if at all. In this
way, the law not only fails to bring about the necessary internal flow of information, it
may systematically operate to keep information of wrongdoing away from the very people
who might best do something about it.
C. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS 45 (1975).
73. See 43 Fed. Reg. 59,998 (1978). The decision to immunize the reports from FOIA
atcess was made after members of industry, associations, educational and other groups reviewing the proposed rules criticized the original plan to provide full access to the QAU report. 43
Fed. Reg. at 59,998.
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regular inspection are separated from reports of findings and
problems and corrective actions recommended. While the latter
QAU reports are treated as confidential company documents by the
FDA, this does not prevent a court from requiring the disclosure of
any report, just as a judge can demand other types of company documents which are confidential for routine inspectorial purposes.
In this Article, a different resolution to this very knotty problem
has been suggested. Under the enforced self-regulation model, the
routine reports of internal compliance groups would not be available
to regulatory agencies. However, when the compliance group discovered a violation of law and management decided to continue the
violation or to ignore a recommendation that the offenders be disci. plined, this fact would be put before the agency. The company
would be granted the privilege of secrecy only so long as it followed
the advice of its internal compliance group. Unrectified violations
which were kept secret would not be immune from government prosecution. If these offenses were independently discovered by government inspectors they could and should be prosecuted. The retention
of a limited direct government inspection capacity is important
under enforced self-regulation to keep internal compliance groups
on their toes. Nevertheless, governments face an ethical dilemma in
deciding to treat as confidential compliance group reports that may
reveal violations of law. But the need for frank reporting of offenses
by compliance groups, the fact that most offenses would rarely become known to anyone (let alone prosecuted) in the absence of such
frankness, and the government's retained ability independently to
investigate and convict, all suggest that the solution to the dilemma
suggested by this Article is reasonable.
Government-mandated internal enforcement procedures are
used in other areas as well. Under the Mine Safety and Health Act
regulations, specially designated miners conduct pre-shift examinations of the mine for hazards to safety. 74 Pre-shift examiners are required to record violations of mandatory health and safety standards
and in fact do so regularly. But in practical terms, they are not expected systematically to audit the mine operators' compliance with
the law. Rather, their goal is to check quickly every working section
of the mine for serious hazards. Inspectorial practice is to check the
74. Three hours before the beginning of any shift, and before any miner enters a working
area of the mine, the pre-shift examiner checks the atmosphere, roof supports, conveyers and
other travelways, and other actual or potential safety hazards. If a hazardous condition is
discovered, the examiner, a miner himself, posts a "danger'' sign, reports the hazards to a mine
official, and notes the condition in a book kept at the site for inspection. 30 C.F.R. § 75.303
(1981).
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violations recorded in the pre-shift examination book and to cite the
violation if it still exists but ignore it if it has been rectified. There do
not seem to have been any prosecutions of pre-shift examiners for
failure to report serious violations, though this would seem to be theoretically possible. Similarly, the Toxic Substance Control Act75 authorizes the Administrator of the EPA to order manufacturers to test
suspect chemical substances;76 internally to monitor compliance with
Act procedures,77 and to indicate proposed quality control protocols. 78 The Administrator can also order revisions of protocols that
he finds inadequate.7 9
Courts and commissions have also imposed monitored internal
enforcement on single companies. Solomon and Nowak80 have reviewed a number of Federal Trade Commission cases in which companies guilty of consumer misrepresentation have been ordered to
(a) institute certain new policies to prevent a recurrence of the offense, (b) establish an internal monitoring function to ensure compliance with these new policies, and (c) establish a record-keeping
system for this monitoring so that the FTC could review and verify
future compliance. Similar interventions have also been common in
consent decrees negotiated by the SEC. 81 The Swedish Market
Courts and the Market Court in the Australian State of Victoria are
also empowered to impose special rules on individual companies to
protect consumers; failure to comply with these particularistic rules
is a criminal offense. 82
In addition to monitored internal enforcement of externally imposed standards, there is at least one example of monitored internal
enforcement of unspec!fted standards, as demonstrated by the Fed75. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). The inclusion of this example was
suggested by Stone, The Place of Enterprise Liabih"fy in the Control of Corporate Conduct, 90
YALE L.J. l, 144 n.167 (1980).
76. 15 U.S.C. § 2603(a) (1976).
77. 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a)(4) (1976).
78. 15 U.S.C. § 2605(b)(l) (1976).
79. 15 U.S.C. § 2605(b)(2)(A) (1976).
80. See Solomon & Nowak, Managerial Restructuring: Prospects for a New Regulatory
Tool, 56 NOTRE DAME LAW. 120 (1980).
81. See Herlihy & Levine, Corporate Crisis: The Overseas Payment Problem, 8 LAW &
POLY. INTL. Bus. 547, 577-94 (1976); Sommer, The Impact of the SEC on Corporate Governance, LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBs., Summer 1977, at 115, 127-34; Comment, Corporate Se!fInvestigations Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 803, 806-11 (1980).
82. See Duggan, Consumer Redress and the Legal System, in CONSUMER PROTECTION
LAW AND THEORY 220-21 (A.J. Duggan & L.W. Darvall eds. 1980). For a discussion of consumer protection legislation in American states which approaches this situation, see Bemstine,
Prosecutorial .Discretion in Consumer Protection .Divisions of Selected State Attorney General
Offices, 20 How. L.J. 247, 276-77 (1977).
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eral Communications Commission's interesting solution to the problem of regulating the broadcast of popular records whose lyrics
promote illegal drug use. Instead of writing rules to specify what
constitutes an unacceptable insinuation that drug use is desirable,
the Commission required broadcasters to ensure that a responsible
station employee reviewed all questionable records before they were
aired. 83
These examples serve two useful purposes. First, they illustrate
that the enforced self-regulation model proposed in this Article is not
radical; instances of all key elements of the model can be found in
current enforcement practices. Second, they can provide the raw
data for much of the empirical research needed to answer troubling
questions about the model. By studying examples of elements of the
model in operation, investigators may be able to evaluate its efficacy
and to increase its effectiveness and practicality.
IV.

WEAKNESSES OF THE ENFORCED SELF-REGULATION MODEL

A. Regulatory Agencies Would Bear Costs ofApproving a Vastly
Increased Number of Rules Each Year

The actual process of rulemaking involves considerable costs. It
might be objected that what is being suggested is a multiplication of
these costs by the number of companies which participate in an enforced self-regulation scheme. Such an objection must be scrutinized carefully. Government rulemaking is at present such an
agonizing and costly process primarily because of the difficulties of
writing universalistic rules which do not hinder efficiency. Particularistic rulemaking would be cheaper because the environmental
contingencies to be considered would be finite rather than infinite.
The regulatory agency would no longer have to undertake such steps
as playing simulation games to assess how di.fferent industries might
use the same set of rules to open di.fferent loopholes. A rule to close
a gap for one company opens a loophole for another. Every word in
every regulation must be carefully vetted lest the agency leave itself
open to new and dangerous precedents. As argued above, precedent
would not be a worry with particularistic rulemaking because each
set of company rules would be, by design, unique. In short, the factors which are crucial to making universalistic rulemaking such a
time-consuming business are absent from particularistic rulemaking.
This claim could be tested empirically by observing particularistic
83. See Stone, The Place
YALE LJ. 1, 44-45 (1980).

of Enterprise Liability in the Control of Corporate

Conduct, 90
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rulemaking in action with air safety84 and other regulatory areas.
There is already some evidence to suggest that particularistic
rules may not demand a much greater effort by regulatory officials.
In the area ofroof control, dust control, and ventilation plans written
by coal mining companies, Mine Safety and Health Administration
officials indicated that while the approval process was time-consuming when first introduced, most plan approvals now can be finished
with only a couple of person-days of agency time. With dust control
plans, the process has become so routinized that about ninety percent of submissions are simply agency-supplied questionnaires completed by the company. Innovative plans, of course, require a
lengthy narrative submission as well, and approval of these may consume up to thirty person-days of time. Plan approval has certainly
not turned out to be a bureaucratic nightmare; company representatives hold informal discussions with government officials to ascertain
whether a new approach is likely to be acceptable before formally
submitting it.
Company rules need only be as individualized as the companies
themselves choose. One would undoubtedly find that companies
participating in enforced self-regulation would adopt large blocks of
rules from other companies, or would adapt model rules suggested
by their industry trade association or the regulatory agency. Much
of the ratification work of the regulatory agency would be routine.
Even so, it must be conceded that the increased costs of scrutinizing
thousands of sets of rules might outweigh the savings from the
greater simplicity of particularistic rules. My guess is that they
would not, given that the ratification of routine particularistic rules
could be entrusted to relatively junior civil servants following guidelines handed down to them, while universalistic rules of necessity
must be debated by many senior civil servants and politicians. 85
84. What one might expect to find from such empirical work is a fairly routine, perfunctory approval of standard rules for common flight paths (e.g., New York-London) and one
hopes, very painstaking scrutiny of out-of-the-ordinary routes (e.g., Auckland-Antarctica). It
was the failure of this special regulatory scrutiny which was partially responsible for the Mt.
Erebus DC-10 crash in Antarctica. See note 48 supra. In other words, the problem was that
the regulatory costs being shouldered were less than they should have been.
85. It could be suggested that the relatively junior civil servants to whom power over approving rules would have to be decentralized would be less formidable adversaries to corporate might than the senior bureaucrats who currently control rulemaking. My experience of
regulatory agencies, however, is that employees who are anti-business firebrands tend to remain in junior positions, while bureaucrats who have a "cooperative relationship" with industry make it to the top. As support for this view, note many of the findings of the Dorsen
investigation into allegations of victimization of adversarial employees of the Food and Drug
Administration. See U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, Eouc. & WELFARE, REVIEW PANEL ON NEW
DRUG REGULATION, FINAL REPORT 17 (1977).
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Even if the rulemaking costs were greater, this would be more than
counterbalanced by the reduced costs of enforcement pointed to earlier. Since enforcing a rule always costs more than writing it, enforced self-regulation would save taxpayers more money in the
enforcement area than it would cost them in the rulemaking domain.

B. Cooptation of the Regulatory Process by Business
Would Be Worsened
Universalistic rulemaking, it might be argued, draws out broader
resistance to the will of business than could be expected of particularistic rulemaking. Ralph Nader or the Friends of the Earth are
more likely to organize against a more lax nationwide effluent standard than they are to oppose an effluent permit for one factory. On
the other hand, local citizens who would never be activists at a national level might protest effluent standards which allowed discharges into their neighborhood fishing hole.
One of the issues to be considered in weighing the relative advantages of particularism and universalism for a given problem is the
extent to which the prospects for popular participation are national
versus local. With regulation of mine roof control plans, for example, more interest can be expected from the miners who will be covered by a particular roof plan than from any national activism over
coal mine roof safety. And in fact, federal mine safety officials told
me of examples where protests by local miners had forced the Mine
Safety and Health Administration to reverse its approval of roof
control plans. In certain circumstances, particularism can harness
democratic participation more e.ffectively than universalism.
In other cases, national debate is obviously more appropriate in
determining regulatory goals. For example, in setting maximum allowable limits for dust concentration in coal mines, not only should
mine owners and miners have a say, but also insurance companies,
epidemiologists, and others. Here, the dangers of cooptation at a local level are too immense to be countenanced; we simply do not
want a situation where local agreements are being negotiated. The
maximum allowable coal dust level should be national and nonnegotiable, and any mine which cannot meet that requirement should go
out of business.
There are many areas where the dangers of cosy local agreements
would be intolerable. However, cooptation can be controlled in
many cases by a particularism severely constrained by overarching
standards which were themselves products of national debate.
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C. Companies Would Bear Increased Costs in Delay and
. Paperwork from Getting New Company Rules Approved
At the outset, it must be noted that requiring companies to write
the private rules which would be the basis of public enforcement
should not impose new costs on them. If companies are not presently writing and enforcing their own rules on safety, environment,
accounting, and other regulatory areas, then there is something very
wrong. The only new costs to a reputable company would come in
the delay and paperwork required in submitting these rules for government approval. As with governmental costs, the costs to business
of enforced self-regulation could be counterbalanced by savings
from having to learn, communicate, and follow one set of rules instead of two (government and corporate); from following rules which
were simpler than existing government regulations; from being able
to innovate in new and cheaper control methods; and from no longer
having to follow universalistic rules which were particularistically irrational or cost-ineffective.

D.

Western Jurisprudence Might Not Be Able to Accommodate
Privately Written Rules Being Accorded the Status of
Publicly Enforceable Laws

A detailed legal feasibility study would be premature for a new
model such as this, which is yet to be evaluated and criticized by
others for its conceptual flaws. While broadly drawing attention to
the fact that legal tradition could pose some practical difficulties for
the implementation of enforced self-regulation, 86 it must also be
pointed out that the proposal runs with the tide of growing judicial
recognition of privately written rules. William Evan has described
the increasing tendency
for the norms of private legal systems to be judicially recognized, as for
example, in a medical malpractice suit in which the code of ethics of
the American Medical Association is invoked; in a suit involving the
internal relations of a trade union in which the union's constitutional
86. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936), in which the Court struck down
federal legislation allowing coal producers to set prices for bituminous coal and to fix wages,
hours, and working conditions for miners. However, the Court has since declined to review an
opinion upholding the National Association of Securities Dealers' regulation of the over-thecounter securities market, First Jersey Sec., Inc. v. Bergen, 605 F.2d 690 (3d Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1074 (1980). See also Note, Rethinking Regulation: Negotiation as an Alternative-to Traditional Rulemaking, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1871, 1880-83 (1981) (discussing the constitutional limits of delegating regulatory authority to private entities). The Note suggests that
much of the antipathy to private delegation stems from due process concerns about companies
being regulated by competitors; on the other hand, laws that placed ultimate regulatory authority in the government have been upheld. See First Jersey Sec., Inc. v. Bergen, 605 F.2d
690 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1074 (1980).
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provisions are accorded legal status by the court; or in a suit by a student against a college or university in which the institution's disciplinary rules are judicially recognized. . . . The adoption, as it were, of
the norms of private legal systems by public legal systems is functionally equivalent to the conferral of rights on private legal systems. 87

Moreover, we have seen that quite developed examples of enforced
self-regulation have evolved already in the United States without
constitutional challenge. Indeed, we have discussed one instance
where a person was imprisoned under public enforcement of privately written law. 88 Imprisonment being provided for violations
which are particularistic rather than universalistic is not novel. Permits under the Clel!fi Water Act regulating the amount of effluent
which can be discharged from a source vary enormously in stringency, depending upon the part of the country in which the source is
located in, whether the plant is new or old, the economic viability of
the industry, and whether pollution reduction is being achieved at a
particular time. Even though this is a law which is applied in a calculatedly unequal fashion, there is provision for imprisonment for
any person who willfully or negligently violates a permit condition. 89
The American legal system has already demonstrated that it will tolerate a law enforcement mode which rejects universalism in favor of
particularism.
E. Particularistic Laws Might Weaken the Moral Force of Laws
That Should .Be Universal
Allowing companies to write their own rules could replace absolute standards with a moral relativism, making the rule of law seem
an arbitrary matter. Whether the authority of law would be enfeebled would depend on how firmly regulatory agencies insisted that
important absolute standards be reflected in all sets of particularistic
rules. It would depend also on how firmly the legislature dealt with
regulatory agencies that ignored the overarching standards governing self-regulation plans.
Ultimately, however, the law derives most of its moral force from
the stigma of conviction. More stigma would attach to corporate
crime if more corporate criminals were prosecuted and convicted. If,
as this Article has suggested, enforced self-regulation would improve
the current dismally low conviction rate of corporate criminals, then
87. Evan, Public and Private Legal Systems, in LAW AND
ed. 1962).
88. See text at note 61 supra.
89. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(l) (Supp. I 1977).
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adoption of the concept could strengthen, not weaken, the moral authority of corporate criminal law.

F. The Model Would Encourage the Trend to
"Industrial Absolutism"
Sixty years ago, Justice Louis Brandeis testified to the Commission on Industrial Relations that as corporations became larger and
more powerful, the threat of "industrial absolutism" became more
profound. 9 Corporations can be as powerful as governments, yet
lack the checks and balances against abuses of that power to which
governments are subject. Employees do not vote in the private government of corporations. When the corporation sanctions an employee, there is no obligation for a public hearing, no observance of
a right to silence, no due process. Giving the corporation power over
lawmaking, it could be argued, would surely take us one large step
closer to the industrial absolutism Brandeis warned us against.
This line of attack on enforced self-regulation can be easily dismissed. It is not as if corporations do not already have policies
under which employees are dismissed, demoted, and sanctioned in
other ways. Enforced self-regulation would in some measure control
industrial absolutism by requiring that corporate policies be made
subject to veto by a democratically constituted government.91 This is
not to deny that industrial absolutism is a problem; it is simply to say
that enforced self-regulation would not contribute to it. Indeed, it
should be hoped that the formalization of corporate compliance policies which would come with enforced self-regulation would be accompanied by a formalization of due process protections for
employees.

°

G. Companies Would Write Their Rules in Ways 'Which Would
Assist Them To Evade the Spirit of the Law
Companies have a long history of deviousness at finding ways of
evading their public responsibilities.92 By giving them control over
90. Quoted in R. EELLS, THE GOVERNMENT OF CORPORATIONS 210 (1962).
91. The democratic ideal is not strengthened only by holding the unelected government of
corporations accountable to the elected government of the state, but also by grass roots participatory possibilities under enforced self-regulation. Already, American regulatory agencies
which have opted to give public recognition to privately written rules have provided for public
comment on such recognition. For example, the Mine Safety and Health Administration gives
notice to miners and their representatives of agreements it has made with mining companies
on ventilation and roofing plans, and of petitions for modifications to the regulations for particular mines.
92. For illustrations, see generally M. CLINARD & P. YEAGER, supra note 2; M. GREEN,
THE OTHER GOVERNMENT (1975).
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the rule-writing process, one might give full reign to their ingenuity
at pulling the wool over the eyes of governments. For a start, companies could evade liability by simply failing to write required rules
(though this could be dealt with by making the penalties for not having rules more severe than those for breaking them). Many companies would surely manage to sneak provisions into their rules
without the regulatory agency realizing the full implications of the
provisions. One can be assured that company lawyers would spend
more time working over their rules with a fine tooth comb than
would any government employee.
There can be no satisfactory answer to this criticism of enforced
self-regulation except to say that, in one way or another, the business
community's resourcefulness at law evasion will be cause for weakness in any system of control. As has been argued above, the opportunities for evasion and exploitation of loopholes are endemic in
universalistic laws controlling business practices. I strongly suspect
that simple, particularistic rules over which business had considerable control would not be more susceptible to evasion than complex
rules over which business had less control93 because the whole inherited wisdom from the study of corporate crime is that it is complexity
which makes conviction so often impossible. Ultimately, however,
this question can only be answered empirically.
H.

Companies Cannot Command Compliance as
Effectively as Government

While most of the other objections to enforced self-regulation
tum on the presumed capacity of the corporation to control its environment in ways that would evade the impact of regulation, this objection looks to the ineffectiveness of control in large organizations.
In a provocative essay, Thomas Schelling has argued that the managers of large organizations are rarely in a position simply to issue
instructions and expect that they will be carried out. 94 Moreover, in
some cases the only way that executives can secure compliance with
their instructions is when government backs those instructions.
93. It would also be wrong to assume that business has no control over existing governmental rulemaking. Joseph Stetler, former president of the American Pharmaceutical Manufacturing Association, once co=ented: "As I look back over three or four years, we have
co=ented on 60 different proposed regulations. At least a third were never published in final
form. And every one, without exception, picked up a significant part of our suggestions." R.
HUGHES & R. BREWIN, THE TRANQUILIZING OF AMERICA 229 (1979). An official of the Association of the British Pharmaceutical Manufacturing Industry told me that many British government regulations were written in their offices.
94. Schelling, Command and Control, in SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE BUSINESS PRE·
DICAMENT (J. McKie ed. 1974).
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Hence, the board cannot fight resistance from the ranks to affirmative action until the government mandates affirmative action and the
directors can plead that the matter is beyond their control. Similarly,
corporate policies which require the wearing of safety helmets or airfilter masks are notoriously hard to enforce; compliance works best
when management can say that the government insists upon it.95
The Schelling argument does not pinpoint a weakness of enforced self-regulation, but of voluntary self-regulation. Corporate
power and the sense oflegitimacy 96 needed to command compliance
may be weak when such orders do not have the force of law. Because self-generated rules have legal force under enforced self-regulation, however, the state can be seen as backing the corporate
command. In fact, a strength of enforced self-regulation is that it
summons the legitimacy of both state and corporate power to entice
compliance while the alternative regulatory models rest on the legitimacy of corporate power alone or of state power alone.
I. The Independence of the Compliance Group Could Never Be
Fully Guaranteed
An independent internal compliance group is essential to the success of an enforced self-regulation scheme. There are two principal
threats to the compliance unit's independence. The first is internal.
The group, through a sense of corporate loyalty, might itself
subordinate regulatory zeal to the attainment of the firm's productivity goals. My study of the pharmaceutical industry97 concluded
that this threat may be somewhat overstated. In that industry, prestige, promotion, and job satisfaction for compliance group personnel
were generally a function of their competence at discovering and
correcting regulatory problems. Their professional commitment was
aimed at ensuring compliance rather than at making profits, and
their careers were oriented more to their subunit's goals than to the
overall profit goals of the company. Indeed, companies themselves
encouraged the compliance groups to strive uncompromisingly for
excellence in ensuring compliance, lest defective products slip
through, creating 'legal problems and customer dissatisfaction.
In the field of occupational safety, moreover, the divided-loyalties problem can be somewhat reduced by including worker or union
representatives in the compliance group. Presumably, union mem95. Id at 86.
96. "Legitimacy" is being used here in the sociological sense; as a condition of general
acceptance by the public as authorized by, or in accord with, prevailing values.
97. To be published in J. BRAITHWAITE, supra note 6 (forthcoming).
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bers or non.management personnel would generally be less willing to
subordinate their personal safety to profit goals. To minimize further the chance of cooptation by management, worker representatives can be given only a short tenure in the compliance unit. 98
The second threat to the compliance group's independence emanates from the corporation itself; despite an overall commitment to
regulatory goals, the compliance groups would be compromised
when management determined that the unit's recommendations
were not in the company's long-run best interests. Here, independence can be strengthened by having directors of compliance report
directly to the chief executive or a board audit committee. My interviews with pharmaceutical industry executives revealed the importance of such independence from middle-management pressure.
There are occasions when it is economically rational temporarily to
suspend commitment to quality standards. If a product is in short
supply and major customers are complaining to the marketing manager, that executive may pressure the quality control manager to pass
an almost-acceptable batch as acceptable. This pressure can be particularly acute when major customers threaten to switch to a competitor unless continuity of supply is guaranteed. An individual plant
manager can also request the quality control director to reverse a
regulatory decision, as when the plant had to achieve certain production goals.
These opportunities for meddling can be limited if the corporation is structured so that the quality control director does not have to
answer to manufacturing or marketing vice-presidents. In some
American pharmaceutical companies, the quality control director
makes an independent written decision on each drug batch, which he
then signs. Only the president can overrule this judgment, and he
must do so in writing. The potential for chief executive overruling is
far lower than it would be for a veto by a marketing or manufacturing manager. People become corporation presidents in part because
they exhibit a modicum of caution. Imagine the consequences for a
president if customers are seriously injured because he personally
overruled Jl quality control decision. No matter how low the chances
of this event occurring were perceived to be, it would be a foolish
risk for a corporation president to take for the sake of one batch of
98. The leading example of worker participation in OSHA self-inspection programs is the
so-called Bechtel plan. At Bechtel Group Inc.'s nuclear power plant at San Onofre, California,
OSHA blessing has been given to monthly labor-management safety inspections as an alternative to government inspections. Under this plan management must explain its reasons for not
adopting the recommendations of the inspection team. See Lublin, OSHA Head Wants to Cut
Regulation, Using Labor-Management Inspections, Wall St. J., Mar. 26, 1981, at 8, col. 4.
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product. While the destruction of a batch might be a major aggravation to the marketing or manufacturing manager, to the president it
is a minor matter. Effectively then, organizational structure lessens
the chances of quality control being formally overruled.
In multiple-division corporations, compliance heads within each
division or subsidiary, in turn, should have only a dotted-line reporting relationship with the chief executive officer of their subsidiary
and a firm line to their immediate superior within the compliance
group. It should be their compliance boss who hires and fires them,
and who determines their yearly bonuses, not the subsidiary chief
executive. Their future should be linked to their performance in securing compliance, not with their success in pleasing a chief
executive.99
The best guarantee of compliance group independence is external: making the failure to report unrectified violations a crime. Regulatory agencies would continually audit to determine whether the
group was discovering and reporting violations as it should. Once an
offense had been discovered, the agency would subpoena the relevant compliance unit reports and uncover any failure of the compliance director to report an unrectified violation. Even a small
number of prosecutions for this offense would probably be sufficient
to encourage compliance directors to put the company's head on the
chopping block - instead of their own. The directors could be further required to sign a quarterly declaration that all violations oflaw
uncovered by the compliance group during that quarter had been
rectified or reported to the government, and that all compliance
group recommendations for discipfuiary action against culpable individuals had also been acted on or reported.
Under any set of independence guarantees, however, top management could still find subtle and not-so-subtle ways to bend the
will of the compliance staff. End top management control through
reporting relationships, and executives would try to control the compliance unit through budget allocations. If budg~tary controls were
removed, fewer travel approvals, poor allocation of offices, staff reshuffles, and similar steps to make the work life of employees miserable could be attempted by management to assert its control. This is
not to denigrate independence-giving strategies such as granting control of budgets for subsidiary and divisional compliance units to the
corporate compliance group rather than to subsidiary or divisional
99. It might also be desirable to require companies to notify the regulatory agency of the
dismissal of a compliance director and to give reasons for such dismissal.
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chief executives. It is just to say that eliminating all threats to compliance group independence is impossible. Nevertheless, if the major
incentives (promotion and budget allocation) are controlled by other
compliance people, then, in spite of residual disincentives, compliance executives will derive the greatest rewards from success at ensuring that the rules are obeyed.
The impossibility of assuring independence for the compliance
group was the greatest concern of readers of earlier drafts of this
essay. My response to them was at two levels. The first response is
empirical; I had seen many companies in the pharmaceutical industry with tough, independent compliance groups which frequently
won internal battles against executives who wished to put profits
ahead of safety. Or I would suggest to the cynics that they go to any
coal mine in the United States and read preshift examiners' reports
which regularly record serious violations of law law for further consideration by government inspectors. Undoubtedly preshift examiners fail to report all they should, but they do report a lot.
My second response goes to what I believe are mistaken presumptions as to corporate structure. The assumption that internal
compliance groups will be impotent is based upon too monolithic a
conception of corporations, one which assumes that they are totally
controlled from the top down. 100 If subunits such as compliance
groups develop enough momentum within the organization, in practical terms it can be difficult for the chief executive officer to bend
them to his will. Chief executives are, in many senses, politicians
who cannot afford continually to antagonize significant corporate
constituencies, lest they refuse to cooperate with him when their help
or loyalty is really needed. This is true whether one is talking about
the president of a university trying to restructure the geography department or the president of a coal company trying to trim the safety
staff. Politicians, in short, are never omnipotent. And if internal
compliance groups are set up in a way that gives them organizational
clout (e.g., with a senior vice-president at the helm or direct access to
an audit committee of outside directors), their effectiveness will
rarely be totally compromised.
'

V.

'

FOR A MIX OF REGULATORY STRATEGIES

Not all of the foregoing problems with enforced self-regulation
can be lightly dismissed. Certainly there is consolation in comparing
100. q: Schelling, supra note 94, at 80 (noting that corporations are not ''unitary entities"
but are "small societies comprising many people with different interests, opportunities, information, motivations, and group interests").
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them to the even more profound pitfalls of voluntary self-regulation
and government regulation. Enforced self-regulation can never be a
panacea to the well-documented problems encountered under the
other two models. To regulate effectively and efficiently the widest
spectrum of corporate behavior, we must seek some optimal mix of
regulatory strategies.
Enforced self-regulation has more bite than voluntary self-regulation organized by a trade association. But the latter still has an
important place, particularly in areas of business regulation where
the public interests threatened by corporate conduct are not great
and where industry does not have a lot to lose or something to gain,
by toeing the line. 101 Voluntary self-regulation is the most attractive
option here because, lacking government-industry adversariness, it is
the cheapest option. Even in areas where the consequences of corporate misconduct are quite profound, voluntary self-regulation can
usefully supplement governmental control (though never be an alternative to it). Had a self-regulation program run by the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association complemented direct regulation by
the FDA, for example, the MER/29 drug disaster might have been
averted. 102 Here, two competitors of Richardson-Merrell, the makers
of MER/29, had conducted tests on the drug and found it dangerous. Since there was no industry self-regulatory body to which test
results could be forwarded, these companies were content merely to
report their warnings to Richardson-Merrell, which promptly ·ignored them. In highly competitive industries, the desire of companies to prevent competitors from gaining an edge can be harnessed to
serve the public interest by a voluntary self-regulation program run
by a trade association.
Even though enforced self-regulation would be more cost-effec. tive than direct government regulation in many areas involving the
conduct of big business, it could never totally replace the latter. For
businesses below a certain size, a viable and independent compliance
unit is impossible. Direct government inspections must be retained
for small businesses. In particular, government inspectors would
continue to have a vital role in catching fly-by-night _ope_rators who
calculatedly operate on the fringe of the law. Medium-sized businesses perhaps could be given a choice of opting in or out of en101. Examples of situations where voluntary self-regulation may be used most effectively
include the regulation of toy durability (as opposed to safety) by a toymaker trade association,
or the regulation of product labels that falsely create the impression they were made by another, better known manufacturer.
102. Details of the MER/29 disaster can be found in Ungar, Get Away With What You
Can, in IN THE NAME OF PROFIT 106 (R. Heilbronner ed. 1972).
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forced self-regulation. Small and medium-sized businesses which
could not sustain a viable and independent compliance unit would
have to be monitored for law observance directly by government inspectors. Nevertheless, the laws being observed could still be laws
privately written and publicly ratified according to the enforced selfregulation model. Smaller companies which could not be bothered
writing their own rules could choose one of a number of standard
packages for companies of different types made available by the regulatory agency. Or, more simply, they could copy another company's rules from the public register of company rules.
Even for big business, a modicum of direct inspection must be
retained. This would keep the internal compliance group on its toes.
At this point, I can envision business people throwing their hands up
in horror, and exclaiming, "so the bottom line is to keep the old government inspections while adding just another regulatory layer onto
them-" Not so. What is being suggested here is a reallocation of
regulatory resources, not a multiplication of them, a shift from expenditures on direct inspection to expenditures on audits of corporate compliance groups. It happens to be my belief that in general,
governments should increase their budgets for business regulation,
but such a belief is not relevant to the present proposal.
A fundamental principle for the allocation of scarce regulatory
resources ought to be that they are directed away from companies
with demonstrably effective self-regulatory systems and concentrated
on companies which play fast and loose. In addition to providing
incentives for self-regulation, such a policy would tend to channel
enforcement toward the companies most likely to offend. Regulatory agencies at the moment often provide disincentives for effective
self-regulation. SmithKline executives drew one example to my attention. In 1979, the company conducted a detailed in-house examination which discovered contaminants in two of its nasal sprays.
Instead of hushing up the problem, SmithK.line treated the employee
who discovered the contaminant as something of a hero. Her efforts
were held up as an example of the kind of vigilance required for the
sake of product purity. SmithKline notified FDA that 1.2 million
bottles of nasal spray were being recalled from drug stores and supermarkets around the country. According to the executives, they
felt terribly discouraged when the government issued a press release
which created the impression that the FDA had discovered the problem and forced SmithKline into the recall.
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CONCLUSION

This Article has suggested that enforced self-regulation could
play an important role in a fundamental redeployment of governmental expenditures for regulating business. Under enforced selfregulation, each company would write its own rules. Once these rules
had been ratified by the government, a violation of them would be
an offense.• The company would be required to establish an internal
compliance group to monitor observance of the ruies and_ recommend disciplinary action against violators. If management were to
fail to rectify violations or to act on recommendations for disciplinary action, the director of compliance would be statutorily required
to report this fact to the relevant agency. The role of the regulatory
agency would be to determine that the company rules satisfied all of
the guidelines set down by government policy, to ensure that the
compliance group was independent within the corporate bureaucracy, to audit the performance of the compliance group, to conduct
occasional spot inspections of operating units as an independent
check that the compliance unit was detecting violations, and to
launch prosecutions, particularly against companies that subverted
their compliance groups.
Many very important details of how enforced self-regulation
might work in practice have not been discussed in this Article. How
would the legislature set penalties for offenses? How would legislation deal with the question of intent, so as to ensure that companies
could not also write their own mens rea standards? How would an
enforced self-regulation scheme pass constitutional muster? Again,
it must be emphasized that the purpose of~ Article is not to present a packaged legislative proposal, ready for implementation.
The ideas presented here may sound complex. They are not. The
Article has attempted to show that one of enforced self-regulation's
virtues is greater simplicity than direct governmental regulation.
Approaches that are new always seem more complex than they in
fact are. Should the reader be asked to explain how the existing
American regulatory system works to a Martian (or even an Australian), it too would seem extremely complicated.
Whether the strengths of enforced self-regulation outweigh its
weaknesses depends on what area of regulation is being considered.
This Article has stressed that there can be strength in the convergence of weaknesses. The challenge is to find an optimal mix of selfregulation and governmental regulation - a mix that will cover the
gaps left by one approach with the strengths of another approach.
By exploiting the advantages and recognizing the weaknesses of en-
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forced self-regulation, voluntary self-regulation, and direct governmental regulation, we might strike a mix that is more effective and
less expensive than any one- or two-dimensional approach.
.APPENDIX: THE CORPORATE CASE LAW APPROACH

Rules have their limits. In a technologically complex industry,
rules cannot be written to cover every environmental contingency
that poses a risk of social harm. To be sure, an advantage of selfregulation is that the rules can more quickly adapt to changing environmental realities or newly perceived threats than can laws imposed
by the state. Even so, however, my research on the pharmaceutical
industry suggests that an accumulation of many minor acts of social
irresponsibility (or of many technical breaches) all too frequently
does greater harm than grossly illegal acts. 103
The most effective method of combatting minor acts of irresponsibilty is through a corporation's identitive power - the use of symbols to control behavior. 104 The culture of a corporation more than
anything else determines the safety of its products and the extent to
which workers are needlessly injured or the environment needlessly
harmed. 105 If top management tolerates an atmosphere in which the
quick fix is accepted, in which rule bending and comer cutting are
not frowned upon, then both socially irresponsible and illegal acts
will :flourish. 106 The strength of identitive power is that it reaches
beyond compliance with written rules. Corporations that indoctrinate their employees with an attitude that "the responsible way is the
company way," that "the spirit of the rules is as important as the
letter of the rules," should be rewarded by regulatory agencies with
lower levels of governmental intervention.
The most effective way to inculcate a corporate identity with socially responsible positions may not be through rulemaking, internal
103. See J. BRAITHWAITE, supra note 6 (forthcoming).
104. This power is one of three suggested by Professor Etzioni. In addition to identitive
power, rewarding with prestige, esteem, acceptance, (pointing out "that's not the sort of thing
an IBMer does,"), there is coercive power, the use of physical means for control purposes (e.g.
torture, imprisonment, removal from the organization); and utilitarian power, the use of material means for control purposes (e.g. promotion, payment of bonuses, allocating capital for
expansion). Etzioni, Organizational Control Structure, in HANDBOOK OF OROAN1ZATIONS 650,
651 (J. March ed. 1965).
105. See C. STONE, supra note 72, at 228-48.
106. The SEC-mandated internal reports of 1976 regarding foreign bribery at Lockheed
and Gulf both reached this conclusion - that the tone set by top management is the critical
determinant of illegal corporate conduct. See Baumart, How Ethical Are Businessmen?, in
WHITE-COLLAR CRIMINAL 119, 125-27 (G. Geis ed. 1968); Brenner & Molander, Is the Ethics
ofBusiness Changing?, HARv. Bus. REv. Jan.-Feb. 1977, at 57.

June 1982]

E'!forced Se!f-Regulation

1505

or external, but rather through the development of a corporate case
law. A senior executive of one of Australia's largest companies indicated in a recent interview that his firm was moving toward a "corporate case law approach." In the executive's view, rules could not
be codified to cover the ever-changing situations that confront executives with ethical dilemmas. His company, therefore, was beginning
to attempt to formalize "corporate case law." The fundamental requirement of the concept is that when executives encounter an ethical dilemma, the problem should be written down. It should then be
passed up through the organization until it reaches a person who
knows the existing case law with respect to this class of problems. If·
existing case law decides the issue, the problem goes no further. But
if an important precedent could be established, it could go to the
"supreme court": the firm's chief executive officer.
A second fundamental requirement of the concept is that any decision be put in writing and sent back down the line. 107 A senior
executive must take responsibility for collating, conceptualizing,
cross-referencing, and drawing out general principles from the case
law. Communicating corporate case law to employees is no greater a
problem than communicating case law handed down by public
courts. Corporations have coped admirably with disseminating in
digestible form the case law in such complex areas as antitrust. Anyone who has read the antitrust compliance guides provided to employees by some large American corporations must be impressed by
the lucid use of examples to inculcate the "dos and don'ts" of competitive conduct. 108
When the corporate case law becomes widely communicated and
understood within the organization, the need to pass ethical dilemmas up the line decreases because they are simply no longer dilemmas. The case law can build a corporate culture in which gray issues
become black and white. Minimizing the incidence of ethical dilemmas is important because of the potential for delay. Corporations
often make the right decisions at the wrong time because they prevaricate while dilemmas are passed up the line. Authority must be
107. Exxon has exemplary policies in this regard. When an individual reports a rule violation up the line, the executive to whom the report is made has an obligation to report back to
the person who made the report what action has been taken. If the latter does not receive this
feedback, he or she knows that somewhere the bad news has been blocked. He or she then has
an obligation to report the breakdown directly to the audit committee of the board. This
builds in a strong disincentive against orchestrated communication blockages to cover up a
violation. See B. FISSE & J. BRAITHWAITE, supra note 6 (forthcoming).
108. Outstanding examples of such manuals include IBM's BUSINESS CONDUCT GUIDELINES and DATA PROCESSING DMSION GENERAL MARKETING GUIDELINES (Sept. 1980), and
General Electric's POLICY ON COMPLIANCE WITH THE ANTITRUST LAWS 20.5 (1970).
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devolved if corporations are to maximize their capacity to seize upon
opportunities when they present themselves. 109 Hence it is essential
that corporate case law be proactive rather than simply reactive.
The formalized organization and reporting of corporate case law
would benefit both the regulators and the regulated. A formalized
case law would render corporate decision-making processes more
vulnerable to criticism. Criticizing unexplicated rules is of less value
than reading and responding to actual key decisions. The corporate
case law approach could never do away with the need for rules. It
could, however, reduce their number and diminish the perennial bureaucratic problem of rules hamstringing action when they are not
really apposite to the specific situation. For top management, formalized corporate case law can tighten management control and reduce the risk of wild, idiosyncratic decisions. Costs would not be
great. Executives do not encounter ethical dilemmas every day of the
week; when they do, a more senior person who has encountered
problems of this type before should be able to resolve the dilemma
rapidly. If the company is criticized for the ethical stance it has
taken on a particular issue, the board of directors can be provided
with a definitive summary of the relevant case law. The cases are in
the files for them to inspect. Criticism can be directed not only at the
wording of rules, but at the managerial judgments underlying the
resolution of specific dilemmas that set important precedents.
How would enforced self-regulation be adapted to a compliance
system based more on case law than on statute law? It would work
by giving the regulatory agency direct access to the written case law.
Instead of devoting their time to monitoring rules, regulators would
read the cases to ~nsure the critical ethical dilemmas were not being
decided without recourse to this case law. The inspectors would also
be charged with ensuring that the decisions reached were in accord
with governmental standards.
Persuading jurists to recognize private case law in public courts
could be an even greater task than obtaining such recognition for
privately written rules. 110 Under enforced self-regulation, however,
the case law would be ratified by the state and would thus, in essence, be only semi-private. Periodic review of the case law by the
regulatory agency could result in the overturning of decisions and
109. This is particularly true with larger organizations. The larger the organization, the
greater the devolution of decision-making power. This was demonstrated empirically by
Mileti, Gillespie & Eitzen, Structure and .Decision Making in Corporate Organizations, 63 Soc10LOGY & Soc. REsEARCH 723 (1979).
110. See Part J.V-D supra.
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principles that failed to conform to the government's overarching
standards. Aggrieved consumers, competitors, or employees could
also appeal to the agency for such relief.
In conclusion, let me state that I am not an advocate of the corporate case law approach, at least not in any immediate or practical
sense. Important details must be worked out before the concept can
be seriously considered. It does, however, present an alternative or
complementary method to rule-based enforced self-regulation that
bears further study.

